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6	CASE 14-M-0101
7	Proceeding on Motion of the Commission in Regard to Reforming the Energy Vision
8	IBM Corporation comments on Track 1 Policy Questions and PSC Staff Proposal
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24 Please provide your professional background:

25 My name is Matt Futch, and I am the Global Policy Director for IBM Energy & Utilities division within the

- 26 IBM Corporation. My primary responsibilities are to shape regulatory and policy strategies which align
- 27 our client's goals with the policymaking and regulatory goals of their jurisdictional agencies. This work
- includes sharing best practices with regulators, drafting thought leadership pieces, and representing the
- 29 company's formal positions on industry impacting policy issues including but not limited to data privacy,
- 30 cybersecurity and renewable energy. This work entails the US states and markets in Southeast Asia,
- 31 Europe and Africa. Appendix A to this filing provides my CV and professional background.

32 What is the purpose of this filing?

I am providing IBM comments to the NYPSC Staff Proposal filed in Case 14M0-0101on August 25, 2014.

34 What is the IBM Corporations role in the Energy & Utilities Industry?

- 35 IBM Energy & Utilities ("E&U") develops smarter energy capabilities in order to improve system
- 36 reliability, customer service, efficiency, and return on infrastructure assets. These technologies help
- 37 utilities better engage customers, reduce costs, manage distributed energy, and transform operations
- 38 for a 21st century power system. Our business line has deployments in all major OECD and non-OECD
- 39 countries providing system integration capabilities to over 100 million metered customers throughout
- 40 our utility client base.

41 How are these comments organized?

- 42 I will start with a concise summary, then provide comments for specific questions as organized by the
- 43 June 4 Track 1 and Aug 25 Staff proposals.¹ Our comments are high level and provide a set of
- 44 foundational policy principles we find important to articulate while the Commission deliberates on a
- 45 final order regarding Track 1 issues and the DSP construct. These principles are outlined in an effort to

¹ <u>http://documents.dps.ny.gov/public/Common/ViewDoc.aspx?DocRefId=%7BDAF259A1-AE34-4869-BA66-E30F596DE3EA%7D</u>

46	assist the Commission in a	voiding common	market design an	nd technology issues	we have observed in

47 other global energy markets initiating this level of market transformation.

48 **Principles of Policy Design for the DSP**

- 49 There are three areas of policy which provide a foundational baseline for successful implementation of
- 50 the DSP model. The principles outlined within each area can serve to enable cost effective deployment
- of technology while providing sufficient flexibility in the market structure for unforeseen effects. The
- 52 three policy domains that enable the REV vision are listed below:
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54 **REGULATORY FRAMEWORK**

- a) Maintain a high degree of public transparency
- 56 b) Establish "Privacy by Design" to protect consumer data²
- 57 c) Focus on regulatory outcomes rather than inputs
- 58

59 TECHNOLOGY PREDICATES

- a) Make cybersecurity a first tier requirement
- b) Require an open-architecture model
- 62 c) Make interoperability a core design point
- 63

64 **DSP BUILDING BLOCKS**

- a) Make the consumer a core business driver for the DSP
- 66 b) Focus on developing DSP functions, not technologies
- 67 c) Develop the DSP vision first, then apply cost-benefit analysis

² <u>http://www.privacybydesign.ca/</u>

68 ENABLING THE STATE OF NEW YORK'S RENEWED ENERGY VISION

69 The proceeding has indicated that all stakeholders to the REV share common goals in establishing a cost effective, consumer friendly and dynamic market place for the State of New York. By issuing a set of 70 71 clear rules within these core policy domains, the Commission will help utilities and the vendor eco-72 system chart a staged and deliberate pathway and avoid costly investment "detours". As previously 73 stated, IBM E&U's business line has been a lead system integrator or business partner in many smart 74 grid deployments throughout the world. In these projects we have observed challenges experienced by 75 regulators and utilities in a set of common issues which emerge when deploying both a set of new 76 technologies and a fundamentally new way for customers to interact with the energy system. These 77 issues stem from the fact that utilities must "keep the plane flying" while redesigning the plane (or grid). 78 It is easy to institute a new regulatory framework that does not necessarily lead to the outcomes sought 79 by both the regulator and the market players. Poorly designed or inflexible rules have the effect of 80 constraining innovation rather than unleashing a new set of technologies that achieve policy goals. It is 81 in the spirit of advancing the goals of the Commission and stakeholders that we offer the following three 82 policy domains and associated design principles for due consideration.

83 **REGULATORY FRAMEWORK**

84 a) Maintain a high degree of public transparency

This is a general statement about the importance of transparency both as a code of conduct for this proceeding and as an operating imperative. Transparency will instill confidence within all energy "customer classes" the State of New York. Parties to this proceeding know that the regulatory process can seem arcane, complex, and confusing to the outside observer. This is due in part to a general lack of engagement from consumers to their energy use and to the general question of energy in their own lives. However, it must be noted that there are encouraging signs this dynamic is changing nationally

and more relevant to this proceeding, in the State of New York³. This new level of customer 91 92 engagement is due to a myriad of factors, with technology and environmental awareness topping the 93 list. What we observe both in the United States and in global energy markets is a consistent relationship 94 between willingness to embrace cost and changes in the energy system and the perception of fairness 95 or transparency of the system that produced these choices. Bringing it down to this proceeding; the 96 easier and more accessible general data on the REV process is to BOTH internal parties AND external 97 stakeholders, the less risk there is of a public backlash. Failure to achieving policy goals or outright 98 reversal of REV goals is possible if there is a strong disconnect between market perception and the 99 reality of the Commission decisions and process that lead to market change. It is a challenge for both the 100 private sector and public sector actors involved in a process like REV to articulate a clean and coherent 101 message as to why the energy system needs to change and how it will benefit consumers. Fortunately, 102 we see the current process as having a high degree of transparency and parties currently engaged in the 103 REV proceeding seem up to this particular challenge. As such, we commend the Commission on its 104 commitment to maintain open access to all records of the proceeding, for enabling such a high degree 105 of participation, and for keeping an eye on generating as much data as possible in the public record to 106 demonstrate robust due process. With this much economic and societal value at stake, we encourage 107 the Commission and all other stakeholder to value transparency to the greatest degree possible without 108 compromising confidentiality, trade secrets, or any other critical security matter. With a consistent level 109 of commitment to open process, the Commission can confidently forge ahead with a ground breaking 110 series of decisions in the US regulated market.

³ <u>http://nyssmartgrid.com/wp-content/uploads/2014-Survey-of-Residential-Electric-Customer-Interest-in-Value-</u> <u>Added-Products-and-Services.pdf</u>

112 b) Establish "Privacy by Design" to protect consumer data⁴

113 Protecting consumer's privacy is an important policy question for the conceptual development of the 114 DSP. A key driver for assigning economic value to services and the operation of a more distributed 115 network will involve a much greater volume, exchange, and potentially distribution of data. Some, but 116 not all, of that data will contain inherently sensitive characteristics of commercial, residential and 117 industrial load. We urge the Commission to review all existing regulatory regimes, such as the California Public Utilities Commission data privacy order⁵, the Colorado Public Utilities Commission data privacy 118 order⁶ and of course the Commission's own existing privacy policy. The issue of privacy is challenging as 119 120 it represents a delicate balance between product innovation (like smartphone applications) and 121 customer privacy (like Facebook profiles). Privacy advocates will always argue for greater protection for 122 consumers against fraud, open-ended access and potential misuse by malicious actors of all kinds in a 123 market rich with "personally identifiable information" or PII. Entrepreneurs, technology companies and 124 most importantly, utilities must implement technology in a complex web of regulation and legal statute 125 in this area of law. In this area, we recommend the Commission and stakeholders review the "Privacy by Design"⁷ framework as starting point for discussion on how to handle the issue of protecting 126 127 consumer data without compromising innovation and the benefits of big data and analytics, which are 128 crucial to realizing the REV goals and implementing the DSP construct. In short, Privacy by Design is a 129 policy framework developed initially by Ann Cavoukian, Ph.D, the Information and Privacy Commissioner 130 in Ontario, Canada. The PbD construct has been adopted by commercial entities such as TRUST-E, which 131 verifies privacy policies for telecommunications and banking companies and was assigned the ⁴ http://www.privacybydesign.ca/

⁵ http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/NR/rdonlyres/79475EAC-B5F5-4E1A-ABAD-D260748B92D2/0/BigData.pdf

⁶ <u>https://www.dora.state.co.us/pls/efi/EFI.Show_Docket?p_session_id=&p_docket_id=10R-799E</u>

⁷ <u>http://www.privacybydesign.ca/</u>

132 compliance agent for the "Privacy Seal" concept as developed by TRUST-E and the Future of Privacy 133 Forum.⁸ It has also been adopted with modifications to IBM's internal policies and infrastructure development activity.⁹ The 7 foundational principles of PbD are: 1) Proactive not reactive 2) Privacy as 134 135 a default setting 3) Privacy embedded into design 4) Full functionality 5) End-to-End security 6) Visibility 136 and transparency 7) Respect for user privacy. Let's be clear; IBM is not recommending that the 137 Commission adopt PbD in full or as the default privacy framework. Rather, we believe the foundational 138 concepts embedded in PbD are a good start for establishing the ground rules for data privacy in the 139 development of the DSP. In particular, we note the principles of respect for user privacy and 140 embedding privacy into the design of platform applications will be important to instilling confidence in 141 the consumer markets and avoiding some of the issues encountered by past smart grid deployments 142 such as the case of multiple smart metering deployments.

143 c) Focus on regulatory outcomes rather than inputs

144 Much of the tone, structure, and focus of the REV outcomes as outlined in the Staff matrix show 145 inferences to the outcome based regulatory regime for electric and gas distribution utilities found in the United Kingdom's RIIO¹⁰ (Revenue=Incentive+Innovation+Outcomes) framework. From an IBM E&U 146 147 perspective, this represents a positive step in the right direction for energy regulation in the United 148 States. While not necessarily suited for all global markets, we find that performance or outcomes based 149 regulation at minimum provides an opportunity for a new set of badly needed network investments to 150 demonstrate their value to customers or as OFGEM, the UK regulator puts it, to create "value for 151 money". If the DSP is going to require capital investments for upgrading the network, then focusing on

⁸ <u>http://www.futureofprivacy.org/issues/smart-grid/smart-grid-consumer-privacy-seal-launch-press-release/</u>

⁹ <u>http://privacybydesign.ca/content/uploads/2011/09/pbd-policy-practice-aug10.pdf</u>

¹⁰ https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/network-regulation-%E2%80%93-riio-model

152 outcomes such as those listed in the REV documentation will enable a longer term view for capital and 153 business model planning. IBM E&U conducted a cursory review of multiple regulatory regimes that demonstrate aspects of performance based regulation. ¹¹ Reviews of current and evolving energy 154 155 regulation regimes in Canada, Turkey, and the United Kingdom were conducted to determine if there 156 were structural commonalities. Common dimensions emerged from this review that may help the 157 Commission promote a step-wise change in the DSP strategy for modernizing the power system while 158 also creating a proper platform in a cost-effective and result-based manner. Around the world, 159 outcomes based or "performance based" regulation is evolving into a more sophisticated, market based 160 methodology. This maturation may help the industry redesign the grid to meet growing policy and 161 customer requirements. When properly executed, this regulatory structure creates a clear planning 162 horizon for utilities and aligns with the product development and risk profile of non-tradition plant 163 investment. These investments are crucial to meet the changing policy and technology requirements 164 being placed the energy system worldwide.

165

166 The common dimensions found in effective performance based regulation are as follows:

- a) Realistic price control periods for capital investment cycles
- 168 b) Measurable performance outputs aligned with policy and
- 169 c) Strong financial incentive and penalty frameworks.
- 170
- 171 We envision a positive outcome for establishing a new regulatory framework that enables the DSP to
- develop cost-effective business plans that are driven by metrics that have a reward/penalty regime
- associated with the outcomes, rather than the associated inputs as is currently practiced. One, but

¹¹ "The Evolution of Performance Based Regulation", Matt Futch, IBM Global Policy Director

174 certainly not the only procedural pathway would be as follows; first, the Commission receives inputs on 175 proposed REV outcomes, second, the Commission converts these outcomes into quantifiable metrics, and finally the Commission issues an order that establishes a RIIO like structure for a significant vetting 176 177 period that may be litigated or held in a separate docket from Case 14M-0101. Whatever the final 178 process may be, our general recommendation remains; to match the ambition of REV, we urge the 179 Commission to consider moving beyond traditional cost-of-service regulation that contains specific 180 regulatory constraints on technology investments (like used and useful, or historical test years) that do 181 not exhibit the traditional poles and wires business of the past. One, but not the only model to consider 182 is outcomes based regulation, which is better aligned with the goals of the REV.

183 TECHNOLOGY PREDICATES

a) Make cybersecurity a first tier requirement

185 IBM's perspective on cybersecurity in the electric power sector is based on an intimate level of business 186 interaction with cyber threats to our global clients in day-to-day operations. In short, we help utilities 187 monitor, detect, isolate, and resolve viruses, malware, and a multiplicity of internal and external threats 188 to utility critical infrastructure. Gartner, a leading independent industry analyst group rates IBM as 189 number one in the "magic quadrant" assessment of security information and event management.¹² 190 Based on these real-life experiences in the field and working with our clients we offer the following 191 recommendations. One, confronting the technical, cultural, and legal issues regarding the security of 192 critical assets on the system should be done early in design, not as an afterthought or a "bolt on" to the 193 P system architecture. Two, security should be seen as risk management and involve an agreed upon 194 series of business and policy metrics that can be measured to demonstrate performance, rather than a 195 set of guidelines that may be subject to misinterpretation. Third, our most important recommendation

¹² <u>http://securityintelligence.com/gartner-2014-magic-quadrant-siem-security/#.U8WGZ53nbs0</u>

196 for the Commission is to establish a set of common cyber-security metrics for the DSP to orient around 197 during modification of existing system and the development of a new IT infrastructure that enables the 198 core functions of the marketplace. When new or addition cyber security metrics are being considered, 199 there are three characteristics IBM considers essential for the metrics to have maximum value. One, 200 they must be easy to obtain with no expensive tools or overly labor-intensive processes need to acquire 201 visibility into the network. Two, they must be easy to understand so a business person and the 202 regulator can make the connection between what is being measured and what it indicates about the 203 organization's risk management, reliability, safety or other performance objectives. Finally, the 204 cybersecurity metrics must be easy to share, such that the information gathered not is so sensitive it 205 cannot be shared among internal organizations and external regulatory authority. This information 206 sharing component is particularly important which underlies the reasoning for much of the recent US 207 Senate draft bill from Chairman Dianne Feinstein which incorporates liability protection, public-private sector information sharing and risk protection.¹³ Finally, IBM believes that no other single action more 208 209 simple and effective to ensuring the profile of security in a new DSP organization than the appointment 210 and empowerment of a Chief Security Officer (CSO) responsible for enterprise-wide cyber security and 211 compliance. The CSO must have ultimate control and responsibility for securing IT and OT across all lines 212 of business, and as needed, into the extended supply chain. Regulators, governments, investors, 213 employees and customers will notice and appreciate the strong signal a CSO appointment sends about 214 how seriously the organization takes security and privacy.

215 b) Require an open-architecture model

216 Open-architecture and interoperability are "technology principle cousins" but they are not to be

217 confused as being the same thing. While interoperability is a key principle to prevent siloed systems and

¹³ <u>http://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/files/serve/?File_id=08de1c1b-446b-478c-84a8-0c3f35963216</u>

218 expensive integration projects, the concept of an open-architecture model is focused on enabling all 219 eco-system players that will want to integrate with the DSP to do so in a relatively fast, simple and easily 220 understood manner. We recommend the open-architecture model for many reasons but the primary 221 one is to prevent a series of closed systems developed by each DSP that prevents rapid, customer 222 friendly and innovative products from reaching the market. To be fair, there are advantages of a 223 "closed-system" approach, such as matching software and hardware, increased security in 224 authentication, and a centralized chain of authority for all end-use applications and access to data. We 225 find that an open architecture may be better suited for the DER and technology integration orientation 226 of the DSP construct. We also "walk the walk" in our own internal business development arena. As an 227 example, IBM is a founding member and advocate of the Open Stack cloud computing platform for 228 public and private clouds. OpenStack is a cloud operating system that controls large pools of compute, 229 storage, and networking resources throughout a datacenter, all managed through a dashboard that 230 gives administrators control while empowering their users to provision resources through a web 231 interface. Founded by Rackspace Hosting and NASA, OpenStack has grown to be a global software community of developers collaborating on a standard and massively scalable open source cloud 232 operating system.¹⁴ This indicates IBM's over-arching belief that new high-value applications for all 233 234 businesses, including the energy sector, would benefit from the speed to market of products, the 235 removal of proprietary capture from vendors, and the creation of a large ecosystem of developers for 236 the entire industry to benefit from.

237 c) Make Interoperability a core design point

As demonstrated by the platform technology working group, there are both multiple standards and
protocols for communications and alternative frameworks, such as NIST 2.0 and the IEEE 2030

¹⁴ https://www.openstack.org/

240 architecture. The standards making bodies and technical communities, including IBM, that participate in 241 this important process are all working hard to develop a coherent family of standards for the entire eco-242 system of intelligent devices and the network protocols necessary to interconnect them. The confusing, 243 multi-party and non-uniform answers found in the standards discussion can and should give 244 stakeholders pause as it portends a potential show-stopping discussion on the "right standard" or the "right architecture" for the DSP. We note this was a critical discussion held at the July 10th NYPSC 245 246 meeting. The education of all stakeholders and the Commission on the importance of standards and the 247 different options available to the utilities and technology community to develop the core building block 248 functionalities of the DSP may be considered the single most important first action in this proceeding. 249 We do not recommend the Commission attempt to resolve a complex technical problem for the 250 standards community by imposing architecture on the DSP platform system. Instead, we recommend 251 the Commission approve the open stakeholder process as recently approved by the board of the New 252 York Smart Grid Consortium (NYSSGC), to develop the DSP business and technical architecture, 253 standards and protocols necessary to achieve the Public Service Commission's REV goals. The ultimate 254 objective of this effort would be to provide the best possible advice to the Commission, Commission 255 Staff, the NYS utilities, technology vendors and other key stakeholders in these technical areas associate 256 with DSP implementation. IBM as a member of the NYSSGC, strongly supports this Consortium led 257 initiative. In addition, we urge the commission to avoid mandating a specific standard and subsequently 258 "freezing out" technology options that could be cheaper, faster, or more reliable depending on how the 259 system is designed. A better policy path is for the Commission to focus on the core concept of 260 INTEROPERABILITY as a cornerstone of development and technology investment and let a wide 261 spectrum organization such as the NYSSGC do the heavy lifting of providing a matrix of functionalities to 262 existing standards. Definitions are important so for the record we offer the following definition of 263 interoperability from the Smart Grid Interoperability Panel (SGIP);

264

265	"The capability of two or more networks, systems, devices, applications, or components to
266	exchange and readily use information—securely, effectively, and with little or no inconvenience
267	to the user. The Smart Grid will be a system of interoperable systems. That is, different systems
268	will be able to exchange meaningful, actionable information. The systems will share a common
269	meaning of the exchanged information, and this information will elicit agreed-upon types of
270	response. The reliability, fidelity, and security of information exchanges between and among
271	Smart Grid systems must achieve requisite performance levels" ¹⁵

272

273 From our experience, smart grid projects and pilots can fall victim to a "cult of customization" that is a 274 common problem for the ICT and software development industry. While developing a small system for 275 reconciling errors in a billing database it may seem trivial to worry about whether this can communicate 276 in a seamless way with 30 other incumbent systems. However, for the purposes of the DSP platform, 277 any blindness to interoperability can prove financially onerous and create a near-fatal delay in delivering 278 core functionality for both external ratepayers and the envisioned aggregating functions of the DSP. 279 Second, a lack of focus on interoperability in system design will provide a functionality and niche-based 280 culture to the development of DSP operations, subsequently increasing risk of going down specific 281 technology paths that cannot easily be modified for integration into other critical systems. A quick 282 example of this would be to have communications systems built without capability to transmit data 283 from an on-site generation facility such as a solar array all the way to the Network Operations Center of 284 the DSP. While this capability may or not be cost-prohibitive to implement right away, it will be 285 important for operators and technology companies to be thinking about this level of interoperability

¹⁵ http://www.sgip.org/Terms-Definitions

286 between systems early in the process rather than making these kinds of connections more costly in the future. By issuing a clear directive that interoperability will be the only acceptable route, the

288 Commission will be sending a signal to the development community and jurisdictional utilities that

- 289 closed, proprietary, and non-interoperable systems will not gain approval for future investment. This
- 290 will save the Commission, and ultimately the stakeholders who want to see the REV vision successful

291 time, money, and delays which prevent speedy delivery of customer and operational benefits.

292 **DSP BUILDING BLOCKS**

287

293 a) Make the consumer a core business driver for the DSP

294 The current vision of the Distribution System Platform as articulate by Staff sees an integrator of 295 multiple technologies including but not limited to customer facing distributed energy, energy efficiency, 296 storage and any number of new in-home products that may or may not be currently commercially 297 available in the market. In a somewhat overused analogy, the DSP operates similar to the Apple IOS or 298 Android operating system wherein the smartphone is the grid and the operating system enables both 299 the DSP and customer to interact in a two way exchange of monetary value and services that benefit 300 both the customer and the provider. In our view, this is an appropriate orientation for the business 301 planning process as customer engagement will become a crucial component of whether or not the DSP 302 construct can actually fulfill some of the policy goals outlined by the Commission. As a very short list of 303 examples, there will need to be an attractive set of "applications" on the DSP operating system for; 304 attracting customer participation in DR, participating in dynamic pricing packages, selling distributed 305 energy back into the grid, charging electric vehicles at time that are advantageous to grid reliability, 306 storing or discharging energy from distributed storage devices, etc. While there is a DER orientation to 307 the concept of the DSP, there is no escape from the economics of scale and minimum participation 308 thresholds necessary to make the business model work for both the DSP and multiple players

integrating into the system. In order to attract this level of participation and monetize the exchange of value from the network edge there will need to be a set of appealing applications that sit on top of the DSP "operating system" or OS. If the DSP construct is to work properly, there will need to be a strong adoption rate, a market demand for new products and services, and a desire amongst consumer and market entrants to engage in the marketplace in a meaningful way. The concept of putting the consumer first when considering design and function is a good place to start as evidenced by history of the smart phone industry and the multiple operating systems it has produced in the marketplace.

316 b) Focus on developing DSP functions, not technologies

317 As a rule, we recommend the Commission spend more intellectual capital on articulating the core 318 functionalities of the DSP in the marketplace in a time based and "building block" manner for 319 investments. This is contrast to specifying technologies, platforms, standards or any other specific 320 technology path in the data analytics, advanced distribution management, asset management, smart 321 meter, or other technologies present or to be developed in the energy supply chain. The reason for this 322 is simple; specifying a technology or set of technologies will reduce competition, promote a closed 323 system, increase costs, and the risk of stranded assets if the specified technology does not live up to its 324 projected performance metrics. We note that the temptation to specify technologies will remain 325 powerful. It is easier to grasp onto the concrete and understood functions of say, a specific smart 326 metering or communications technology, rather than list minimum functions and trust the market to 327 meet those requirements. On the other hand, there needs to be a clear set of minimum functions 328 outlined in the REV and ideally, a "building block" approach wherein the first phase of investments must 329 meet specific operational requirements of the DSP, like advanced distribution management systems 330 then an outline of the next building blocks to follow to provide certainty to the market. As a quick 331 example of how this can play out in practical sense we will provide the example of advance metering 332 infrastructure, which is considered an area of contention in this proceeding. If the Commission were to

333 take a technology specific approach, there may be a decision to either mandate fully functioning smart 334 meters with two-way communications or a decision to ban deployment of AMI until more cost-benefit 335 analysis is conducted. In the functionality focused approach, the Commission would come to consensus 336 about what the primary functions of the DSP are needed in the sensing, monitoring, data collection, and 337 pricing arena and the stakeholders would then weigh in on what technologies would be required to 338 meet those functionalities, at what cost, and the timing associated to deliver these functionalities in the 339 timeline specified by the Commission. A final comment here is that this approach may not satisfy all 340 parties as there will be advocates and opponents of almost every technology pathway that could be 341 taken to meet the core goals of the REV and the DSP in particular. This is the point, an approach that 342 focuses on functionalities required and when they are required in the marketplace will help train the 343 eco-system towards meeting these functions rather than battling for market share in a perceived 344 "scarcity" dynamic imposed by the selection of a specific technology.

345 c) Develop the DSP vision first, then apply cost-benefit analysis

346 Through IBM E&U's global energy practice we have developed a large data set on how utilities, 347 governments, and regulators have either succeeded or failed to fully realize the potential of their 348 original policy and technology goals. In particular, we note the relative deliberate nature of Japan's 349 market restructuring plan and how the utilities are developing plans to re-configure the grid for 350 renewables and a fully competitive retail market. This stands in contrast to the severe challenges of the 351 EU's Carbon Trading Scheme (ETS) which was designed to create a price on carbon and subsequently 352 support the overarching goals of the European Union's third energy package, otherwise known as the 353 "20/20/20" goals. Generally speaking, there was a more holistic and defined sense of what the policy 354 making community wanted the energy market to look like and what energy policy goals would be 355 achieved in the restructuring of Japan post-Fukashima. Unfortunately, the econometric focus of

356 Europe's ETS scheme was put "on paper" well before there was consensus on an EU-wide energy vision. 357 This has arguably led to unstable dynamic, with low carbon prices and separate member state policies 358 preventing an integrated and fully functioning EU-wide carbon market. In the United States, there has 359 been criticism from industry observers that the focus of early government investment was too heavily 360 concentrated on one technology area (smart meters) and not on a holistic vision of the energy system. 361 Whether this observation is fair or not is less relevant to our recommendation than the concept that a 362 strong vision is needed for where policymakers and regulators want to move the energy system before 363 diving directly into a detailed cost-benefit analysis. If we look at the evolution of renewable energy 364 portfolio standards in the US states, you can see that there was a clear policy mandate with potentially 365 less focus on the financial impact until the policies were promulgated at the Public Utilities Commissions 366 where the regulatory charter of consumer protection and cost-benefit analysis for investments were 367 generally allowed to work its way through a tradition litigation pathway. In many states, the post-368 implementation analysis has shown that rates have NOT increased at the level and rate as originally 369 feared and some of this can be credited to the leeway that legislatures gave to the PUC's to work with 370 the energy providers and stakeholders in developing retail rate caps, staggered capacity programs, 371 tiered subsidy programs etc. To summarize, our experiences in the US market and abroad indicates the 372 importance for regulators and the stakeholder community to have a common understanding of what 373 the energy vision is before engaging into a highly technical econometric analysis. This allows room for 374 creativity, innovative ideas, and a more predictable business investment climate that all stakeholders 375 can subsequently debate on the relative costs and benefits of pursuing. Without the Commission 376 setting clear guideposts, the entire eco-system supporting the REV process will get stuck in a circular and 377 narrow financial argument on technologies, price curves, and societal benefits.

379 TRACK 1 POLICY QUESTIONS

380 We now answer select policy questions and offer actions responding to the Track 1 policy document. 381 Are the outcomes the appropriate results the Commission should be striving for in this effort? 382 As it stands, the current categories cover a good spectrum of the key functions the Staff envisions as 383 justifying investment and implementation of the DSP. However, we note that there are some important 384 additions that could be made to help bolster Category V and Category VI. Under the innovation 385 category we recommend a new subject: "Enable Continuous Research and Development". There 386 remains a persistent research and development gap for utilities to either directly invest or partner with 387 the private industry to develop new applications for DER, customer products, and other network edge 388 technologies. This has a deleterious effect on the timing, interoperability, and cost of deployment for 389 consumer facing products that quickly integrate into utility systems. We recommend adding this 390 "RD&D" element to the innovation category as the DSP will need to be operating in a continuous 391 innovation business cycle, rather than the fixed investment operating system of the past. Also, we 392 would recommend that the Staff add "Customer Privacy" to Category VI: Customer Satisfaction. We 393 note that in many experiences deploying smart grid projects with any sensing technology (smart meters, 394 communications, HANS, etc.) there is the issue of how to balance the right to privacy in existing statute 395 versus an innovative and open market which typically requires a relatively granular customer data set. 396 We recommend including privacy as a key subject area under customer satisfaction. While DSP 397 consumers may not ask for privacy as a specified component, a lack of early design for consumer 398 protections in this area will derail or delay many critical product launches that would help make the DSP 399 marketplace successful in early phases of deployment.

400 Discuss the preferred analytical framework to assessing benefits and cost

401 In our experience, there is no established cost-benefit methodology which perfectly incorporates all 402 policy, environmental, reliability, stranded cost and consumer protection metrics. These metrics and 403 likely many more constitute drivers for network and technology investment. From our perspective, 404 there are several issues which need clarification or at minimum base lined within any cost-benefit 405 analysis framework. A partial list of key elements requiring rigorous analytical focus are a) a defensible 406 pricing methodology for valuing ancillary services, energy and capacity and other concomitant features 407 of DER b) a proper economic model for monetizing the reliability and environmental attributes of DER 408 and any other generation resource c) energy storage valuation in the wholesale and retail markets d) 409 defensible price curves on all relevant and near-future technologies that would advance the capability 410 pathway for a DSP. It's important to begin answering these questions in order for providers to 411 incorporate a Commission approved methodology as a baseline for their own business plans. IBM has 412 performed cost-benefit analysis in the smart grid arena in many global markets and clearly there are 413 many well-qualified firms in this arena. Rather than recommending any company or methodology our 414 recommendation we urge the Commission to consider two separate actions. First, encourage a non-415 vendor, non-utility party to conduct its own analysis by hiring a respected third party and filing the 416 resulting study. Second, the Commission may want to consider issuing a request for proposal (RFP) 417 based on its own internal decisions on key metrics following the full results of the proceeding. We note 418 that this is what the UK's energy regulator, OFGEM, did for the Gas SCR cost-benefit analysis on Demand Response¹⁶ within the RIIO regulatory regime. Considering that many of the metrics in PSC Staff "REV 419 420 outcomes matrix provided have similar parameters, OFGEM's action may be a good model to follow. 421

¹⁶ <u>https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/ofgem-publications/85990/poyrygasscrdsrcbafinalreportv20.pdf</u>

423 CONCLUSION

424 In conclusion, we would like to commend the Commission on managing a highly transparent, inclusive, 425 and deliberate process to constructing a new energy vision for the New York that enables a cleaner, 426 more reliable, and policy aligned energy system. Considering the rate of technology adoption, it is no 427 small task to develop a new regulatory framework that enables a new marketplace rather than 428 burdening it with narrow, technology specific rule makings. We find the concept of a "Distribution 429 System Platform" as currently envisioned in Staff's initial proposal as the right direction for enabling 430 customer choice, maintaining reliability, and establishing an energy "goods and services" market place 431 that reflects the State of New York's focus on renewable energy, energy efficiency, and utility 432 innovation.