Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation
d/b/a National Grid

Matter No. 25-01548

In the Matter of the June 22, 2025 Storm

Part 105 60-day Storm Report

August 25, 2025

Submitted to:
New York Public Service Commission

nationalgrid

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1. Introduction/Overview/Executive Summary

The storms that impacted National Grid's upstate New York service territory on June 22, 2025, caused extensive damage and led to a significant number of extended customer outages. The Company implemented its established emergency response procedures to prepare for and respond to the storms, and to provide effective and appropriate communications to customers as well as State and local agencies and officials. The following report supplements the Company's July 25, 2025, "Utility Emergency Performance Metrics New York Scorecard" for the June 22, 2025 Severe Weather Event filed in Matter No. 25-01548 ("Scorecard").

The National Weather Service confirmed that two tornadoes touched down in Central New York on June 22, 2025. One tornado, an EF-1, caused three fatalities in Clark Mills, while another EF-1 tornado, touched down shortly after, near Clinton causing significant damage but no fatalities.

Tornado #1 – In Clark Mills:
This EF-1 tornado struck early Sunday morning, causing trees to fall on homes, which led to three fatalities. The tornado traveled 2.43 miles with winds up to 105 mph while cutting a path 300 yards wide.



Tornado #2 – Clinton, NY:
This EF-1 tornado touched down right after the Clark Mills tornado, causing damage to a farm, including a destroyed silo, and uprooting numerous trees, especially around Hamilton College. This tornado registered winds up to 110 mph, traveling 4.74 miles while spanning 450 yards in width.

While severe weather was anticipated, the rapid intensification of storms into supercells that produced the referenced tornadoes caught residents and meteorologists off guard. The short-lived and localized nature of the storms coupled with the impacts of the mesoscale convective system dramatically impacted the region, delivering straight-line winds exceeding 90 mph.

In the days leading up to June 22, 2025, National Grid had multiple internal discussions to maintain awareness of the forecasts and to establish plans for the impact expected from the weather

system across the upstate New York service territory. The Company communicated plans for response to the forecasts with employees, which included the scheduling of off-hour coverage using internal line crews in all upstate New York Divisions that would begin expanded coverage during off-hour schedules Friday evening, June 20, with shifts to continue incremental coverage throughout the weekend in anticipation of possible customer interruptions. All on-property Company contractor resources also were identified, along with the number of restoration resources that would be available if required.

The severity of the storm system far exceeded what was originally forecast. While the entire upstate New York Service Territory was impacted from the storm system, the most significantly impacted area was National Grid's NY-Central Division. The peak customer outages and total number of customers affected in the impacted areas were as follows:

		Peak Customers Affected	Total Customers Affected	Total Outages
DIVISION	**NY-Central**	64,657	118,244	766
DIVISION	**NY-East**	8,414	24,468	158
DIVISION	**NY-West**	1,070	3,647	68
STATE	**New York**	**65,546**	**146,359**	**992**

Public safety during an emergency or storm event is the Company's primary concern in all areas. The elimination of hazards to the public takes precedence during emergencies, which includes plans to promptly secure downed wires and make areas safe that are compromised with damaged electrical equipment. National Grid's response in the NY-Central Division involved the dispatch of trained and qualified employees or contractors to investigate reports of downed wires and public hazards to fix, make safe, and/or arrange for standby personnel if needed to protect the public.

National Grid immediately responded to the change in size, scale, and complexity of the event from what had been forecasted and expected by securing additional, incremental resources and implementing a plan to move internal resources from the Company's Western and Eastern Divisions to impacted areas in the Central Division. The Company mobilized more than 2,430 line, tree, and service workers to restore power to customers.

The Company's process to restore power after a major event follows an industry standard and best practice for utilities to optimize restoration time. Repairs are generally made in the order of the path that electricity takes from the power plants to the customer. Company resources begin with transmission and primary circuits that can affect a large number of customers. Then, and often times in parallel, crews restore lateral distribution lines that can affect many customers; secondary distribution lines that affect fewer customers; and, finally, service lines to individual customer homes or businesses.

National Grid provided timely and accurate information pertaining to the Company's restoration efforts. The Emergency Response Organization communicated both internally and externally to maintain a continuity of messaging to the general public, news media, local officials, and employees. To the greatest extent possible, the Company provided extensive information across

a wide variety of traditional and digital channels during its response to the impacted Divisions with accurate messaging timed to coincide, when possible, with local news cycles.

Although the June 22 storms were much more severe than forecast, National Grid was well-prepared and responded to the event in compliance with the Company's New York Electric Emergency Response Plan ("NY-ERP"). The response included:

- Moving restoration resources from the Company's NY-West and NY-East Divisions to the NY-Central Division;
- Securing additional resources from the following sources:
    - Company contractors;
    - Direct contact, non-investor-owned utility (unaffiliated) external resources;
- Proactively communicating with State, county, and local emergency management officials to keep them updated on restoration efforts;
- Conducting community leader conference calls with State, county, and local officials, and other key stakeholders without delay once the magnitude of the event was realized, and holding such calls daily throughout the event;
- Conducting daily outbound calls to critical facility customers and life support equipment ("LSE") customers;
- Communicating and working with county officials and the New York State Department of Transportation to coordinate any road clearing activities as required;
- Proactively issuing targeted communications and messaging directly to customers through news and social media outlets to provide safety information and storm restoration updates;
- Deploying the Company's Mobile Emergency Operation Center to the Westmoreland NY staging site / material lay-down yard to provide support for field activities associated with the storm response;
- Distributing dry-ice and bottled water to customers; and
- Following all protocols required by the NY-ERP.

Restoration began on Sunday, June 22, 2025 at 8:00am in the NY-Central Division. In less than 40 hours from the start of restoration more than 95% of the total affected customers in the impacted area were restored. Final restoration occurred in NY-Central on Wednesday June 25, 2025 at 14:52pm.

The Company also expeditiously processed reimbursement applications from customers who experienced extended outages because of the storm as provided for in Public Service Law ("PSL") §73.

National Grid conducted a comprehensive After-Action Review for this event as required. The After-Action Review enables stakeholders to identify what went well, while also identifying areas for improvement relative to preparedness, planning, and response efforts associated with the event. Lessons learned from the review are reinforced throughout the year as part of employee training, drills, and exercises to better respond and recover from future emergencies.

National Grid greatly appreciates the support of its customers, and State, county, municipal, and local officials during the storm restoration.

2. Advance Planning Activities

The NY-ERP provided the framework for the Company's actions with regards to preparation, operational response, coordination, and communication for the June 22, 2025, storm event.

Weather Monitoring

National Grid performs a comprehensive review of the weather on a daily basis that includes an assessment of the potential for severe weather impacts. The Company's third-party weather service provides detailed weather forecasts three times daily that include a synopsis of current conditions, a forecast for the remainder of the current day, current evening, a look ahead to the next day, and a look ahead to the next three-to-five-days and the six-to-ten day outlook with a focus on up-to-date conditions specific to National Grid's service territory designed to report on the threat of wind, snow, ice, rain, flooding, temperature, and thunderstorms, and other severe weather activity. National Grid also monitors the National Weather Service ("NWS") and other publicly available weather forecasting resources.

When planning for a severe weather event, the Company will consider the more conservative forecast (i.e., the forecast indicating the greatest potential impacts to the electric system) when developing plans for response associated with predicted severe weather.

The intensity of the weather conditions on June 22, 2025, far exceeded forecast expectations. The actual impact of the weather was most significant in the NY-Central Division. The National Weather Service confirmed two (2) tornadoes touched down in Central New York. The first, an EF-1 tornado, struck Clark Mills, NY, delivering 105 mph winds that tragically resulted in three fatalities when trees fell on two homes. The second tornado touched down near Hamilton College with 110 mph winds, as part of a line of severe thunderstorms that moved through the region. In addition to the tornados, each with winds in excess of 100 mph, the region experienced strong straight-line winds reported to reach speeds of 90 mph and significant rain, which resulted in significant damage to the Company's electric infrastructure.

A representative summary of the DTN weather forecast is provided in Tables below.
Supporting information for this section is included in Appendix W of the Company's July 25, 2025, "Utility Emergency Performance Metrics New York Scorecard" for the June 22, 2025 Severe Weather Event filed in Matter No. 25-01548 ("Scorecard").

Date and Time	Forecast
June 20, 2025 @ 0600	Weather forecast for the NY-Central Division EEI-1 Wind/Gust Level for June 22 Gust forecasts for June 22; 5-15 MPH Peak gust forecast of 20-25 MPH for June 22 Forecast for Thunderstorm Impact across all three Upstate NY-Divisions. THUNDERSTORM IMPACT SATURDAY NIGHT/EARLY SUNDAY MORNING: Thunderstorms will be possible Saturday night and into early Sunday morning. Confidence is low/medium in timing and intensity due to model disagreement.

	<table><tr><th>REGION</th><th>TIMING</th><th>T-STORM CHANCES</th><th>LIGHTNING</th><th>T-STORM GUST</th></tr><tr><td>Western NY</td><td>12 AM Sun-4 AM Sun</td><td>60%</td><td>Low</td><td>35-45 mph</td></tr><tr><td>Central NY</td><td>10 PM Sat-5 AM Sun</td><td>70%</td><td>Low-Medium</td><td>40-55 mph</td></tr><tr><td>Eastern NY</td><td>11 PM Sat-6 AM Sun</td><td>70%</td><td>Medium</td><td>45-55 mph</td></tr></table>
June 21, 2025 @ 0600	Weather forecast for the NY-Central Division EEI-2 Wind/Gust Level for June 22 Gust forecasts for June 22; 25-30 MPH Peak gust forecast of 30-35 MPH for June 22 Forecast for Thunderstorm Impact across all three Upstate NY-Divisions. THUNDERSTORM IMPACT: SATURDAY NIGHT/SUNDAY MORNING: Thunderstorms will be possible Saturday night and into early Sunday morning. Confidence is low/medium in timing and intensity due to model disagreement. <table><tr><th>REGION</th><th>TIMING</th><th>T-STORM CHANCES</th><th>LIGHTNING</th><th>T-STORM GUST</th></tr><tr><td>Western NY</td><td>4 AM Sun-7 AM Sun</td><td>40%</td><td>Low-Medium</td><td>35-45 mph</td></tr><tr><td>Central NY</td><td>11 PM Sat-9 AM Sun</td><td>80%</td><td>Medium</td><td>40-50 mph</td></tr><tr><td>Eastern NY</td><td>1 AM Sun-10 AM Sun</td><td>70%</td><td>Medium</td><td>40-50 mph</td></tr></table>
June 22, 2025 @ 0700	Weather forecast for the NY-Central Division EEI-2 Wind Level for June 22 Gust forecasts 20-30 MPH Peak gust forecast of 30-40 MPH Forecast for Thunderstorm Impact across all three Upstate NY-Divisions. THUNDERSTORM IMPACT: SATURDAY NIGHT-SUNDAY: Thunderstorms will be possible Saturday night and into Sunday, the greatest chances across northern portions of Central/Eastern NY. The strongest storms are expected overnight Saturday and into Sunday. Confidence is high in intensity, though lower in timing. Thunderstorms end time is a question mark on Sunday, but this is dependent on how Saturday night activity pans out compared to what is expected with model guidance. An extension of thunderstorm timing into the evening may be possible. <table><tr><th>REGION</th><th>TIMING</th><th>T-STORM CHANCES</th><th>LIGHTNING</th><th>T-STORM GUST</th></tr><tr><td>Central NY</td><td>Ongoing-5 PM Sun</td><td>80%</td><td>Medium</td><td>40-55 mph</td></tr><tr><td>Eastern NY</td><td>Ongoing-6 PM Sun</td><td>70%</td><td>Medium</td><td>40-55 mph</td></tr><tr><td>Western NY</td><td>Ongoing-2 PM Sun</td><td>40%</td><td>Low-Medium</td><td>35-50 mph</td></tr></table>

The activities described below show preparations and preliminary communications with employees and contractors on National Grid property beginning June 20, 2025 (Company contractors). Commensurate with the impact realized during the June 22 event, and for purposes of this storm report, National Grid considers "pre-event" activities to be inclusive of all actions up to 3:00 AM on June 22, 2025.

Preparing Company Staff and Contractors and Pre-Storm Planning

National Grid complied with its NY-ERP and communicated with employees and contractors regarding activation of the emergency response organization, which included Company personnel shifting into their emergency response assignments and the mobilization of equipment and

resources in anticipation of scattered thunderstorms forecasted for Saturday and Sunday, to ensure readiness for any potential increase in outage activity that could affect customers; however, the projected weather conditions did not meet the criteria necessary to trigger pre-event Emergency Response Plan obligations.

National Grid conducted multiple internal discussions to maintain awareness of the forecast and developing conditions. To maintain situational awareness, additional communications took place with National Grid's Contract Management and Vegetation Management disciplines, requesting contract personnel to be prepared if required.

The forecast preceding the storm event remained consistent and was not representative of the storm conditions actually experienced. On Friday June 20, 2025, National Grid communicated plans for event response with employees, which included the scheduling of all internal Company line crews in all upstate New York Divisions to be on the property in anticipation of possible customer interruptions attributed to the forecast of severe weather throughout the weekend. Additionally, all on-property Company overhead line contractor resources were identified along with the number of restoration resources that would be available if required.

In addition to communicating with company employees and company overhead line contractors, on Friday, June 20, NY Vegetation Management contractors were notified to be prepared for a potential multi-day event, affecting all regions of the Company's service territory. The NY Vegetation Management contractors notified included:

- Asplundh Tree
- Nelson Tree
- Lewis Tree
- Ironwood
- K.W. Reese
- Tree Care of WNY
- O'Connell

Recognizing the severity of the situation following the storms that impacted the Northern and Mohawk Valley Regions in the early morning hours on June 22, 2025, which far exceeded what was originally forecast, the Company moved without delay to initiate its restoration response.

National Grid immediately requested additional resources and implemented a plan to move internal resources from its unimpacted Divisions to the impacted areas.

NY Distribution OH Line, Company and Contractor overhead line resources, and NY Vegetation Management Contractors were notified to begin mobilization into the NY-Central Division to support restoration efforts.

The following actions were taken by the Company in response to the weather conditions and impact from the storm:

- National Grid immediately responded to the change in size, scale, and complexity of the event to notify and dispatch restoration resources, while in parallel, initiating the process to secure external non-investor-owned utility distribution line resources through direct contact to external contractors.

- Additionally, National Grid implemented a plan to move internal restoration resources (Company and Company Contractor) from the unaffected Divisions to the Central Division.
- In accordance with NY-ERP Section 4.2, the Company activated required Incident Command System ("ICS") Leadership personnel at the State and Branch Level who subsequently notified employees that they had been activated into their emergency response roles to support restoration activities for the event.
- Designated Company Emergency Operations Centers were opened.

Mutual Assistance

The weather forecast for this event did not indicate the need for additional resources other than the actions taken to schedule Company crews for extended coverage beginning in the afternoon of June 20, 2025 that would extend throughout the weekend. National Grid did not (nor did any other North Atlantic Mutual Assistance Group Member Company) request a pre-event Mutual Assistance Call prior to June 22, 2025.

National Grid assessed its ability to move internal resources and immediately initiated the movement of internal Company crews and Company overhead line contractors from NY-West and NY-East to NY-Central.

As reported on the Emergency Outage Reporting System Report issued June 24, 2025, at 7:00am, in total, National Grid secured a commitment of 2,436 incremental, external FTE (Full-Time Equivalent) resources for response and support of restoration efforts for this event.

Customer Outreach

Consistent with NY-ERP Sections 17.3 and 17.4, because the weather forecast did not indicate that the anticipated effects from the event were likely to result in a restoration period greater than 48 hours in duration for 90% of the affected customers, the Company did not make pre-event outbound calls to Critical Facility Customers or Life Support Equipment ("LSE") customers in the NY-Central or NY-East Division.

In response to the severe weather impacts on June 22, and continuing through the duration of the event, National Grid conducted daily Critical Facility and LSE customer outreach in compliance with the NY-ERP requirements. National Grid also promptly initiated contact with County Emergency Management Officials, local municipal contacts, elected officials, and key stakeholders that included the conducting of appropriate Community Leader Conference Calls in the NY-Central Division. Community Leader Conference Calls continued daily throughout the event.

Warehouse / Inventory

The Clifton Park, Liverpool, and Buffalo warehouses in upstate New York had 85 storm kits on hand, which satisfies the quantity requirement found in NY-ERP 7.1. The Company determined that this number of storm kits on hand, on hand pole quantities, vendor pole stock, transformer levels, and existing on hand stock of ancillary items, were sufficient to support the anticipated scope of the event. During the event, 10 storm kits (1 yard kit) were deployed upon request from OH Operations to a material staging site located at 4608 NY-233 in Clinton, NY. All material needs

were met through the existing local storeroom stock, Upstate NY warehouse stock, and the storm kit stock deployed at the staging site with any/all identified shortages and replenishments transferred from the Company's UNY warehouse locations within 24 hrs. of request.

The upstate warehouse operations were prepared for additional material requests if such requests were made. All local storerooms were fully stocked with poles, and approximately 375 additional poles were brought in from the Company's vendor within 24hrs of request.

Most needed items were transformers, crossarms and braces, fuses, wire/cable and miscellaneous hardware. Twenty-six re-supply deliveries of these supplies were made to the Rome, Utica, Hinsdale, and Cicero locations, and the staging site in Clinton Sunday (6/22) through Wednesday (6/25). All other material needs were met through the existing stock at local storerooms.

Transportation / Fleet

The Fleet Services organization assessed and confirmed vehicle inventory and released vehicles from maintenance to respond to the anticipated event as required. The Fleet Services organization also initiated its response to support nighttime fueling requirements of vehicles at hotel locations and support any required vehicle maintenance during the event.

3. Damage Assessment

National Grid Emergency Response Organization leadership and the various functions within the Emergency Response Organization use the information from damage assessment surveys to assist with the formulation of plans for appropriate corrective action, which includes the development of ETRs. The determination of damage sustained from a severe weather event is made as soon as possible once field personnel can be dispatched without unacceptable safety risks from continued severe weather conditions. The access and mobility difficulties caused by the storm that impacted first responders and public works resources likewise affected the Company's damage assessment function. Damage assessment surveys are performed to assess the physical damage from a storm. The surveys provide key situational awareness as to the extent and location of damage from the storm, such as primary wires down, down trees, broken poles, damaged transformers, etc., on overhead distribution feeders or transmission lines. Damage assessment surveys are conducted by experienced personnel and may be done by vehicle or helicopter as conditions dictate.

In response to the change in weather conditions and impact from the storm, Damage Assessment teams equipped with proper personal protective equipment were activated within the Emergency Response Organization.

Consistent with Section 11 of the NY-ERP, these teams were mobilized, deployed, and completed Phase-I Damage Assessment patrols and Phase-I Surveys within 24 hours of the start of restoration as assigned in NY-East Branch Operations.

- The Phase-I Damage Assessment Patrol identifies physical damage such as primary wires down, poles broken, and transformers down on three-phase Circuit Mainlines or Transmission Lines as assigned by the Branch Planning Coordinator working in coordination with the Damage Assessment Field Coordinator.

- The Phase-I Survey is a concentrated survey intended to cover a sizeable portion of what is often a highly populated area affected by the storm in a rapid manner to assess the impact to the mainline, three-phase circuits.
- Feeder sweep is a patrol of the feeder to check if all services are restored and that all temporary repairs are noted and/or completed. Feeder sweeps are typically performed by traditional survey personnel, so line crews may continue with the restoration activities.

Phase-I Damage Assessment patrols began as soon as possible following the impact of the storm, when field personnel were able to be dispatched without unacceptable safety risks from severe weather conditions and when the potential for additional damage to the electric system would be low in proportion to the expected level of damage already sustained.

The Branch Operations Coordinator initiated the Phase-I Surveys by contacting the Branch Planning Coordinator who worked in cooperation with the Damage Assessment Field Coordinators to arrange for the safe and efficient deployment of the damage assessment patrollers.

Determination of damage from these surveys, as well as, Outage Management System ("OMS") data, customer calls, 911 information, and feedback from crews already deployed in the field provide the Emergency Response Organization leadership team with the necessary information to formulate appropriate objectives and plans of action for the Company's response.

Determining the patrol sequence for feeders to survey involves a variety of criteria that are in most cases specific to the circumstances of the event. Considerations include feeder restoration priority rankings, Critical Facilities affected, total customer outage counts on the feeder, and coordination of priorities both internal and external to the Company.

National Grid deployed survey personnel consistent with the procedures outlined in NY-ERP Section 11. Damage was recorded and reported based on the needs of the specific area. iPad "Collector" software was used to collect and report damage and/or damage was reported real time via calls from the Damage Assessor field teams to their respective Damage Assessment Field Coordinator or local restoration crew supervisor or crew foreman working on the feeder. Outage Tickets were reviewed and assessed as provided by the OMS and included written comments by paper and/or text entries into the OMS for field team visibility and response depending on the local barn's need. This, along with damage assessment work packages and continuous communication between the Damage Assessment Field Coordinators and the local Field Operations Supervisors, helped Field teams better understand the extent of damage leading to more accurate ETRs.

- Phase-I Damage Assessments were mobilized, deployed, and completed within 24 hours of the start of restoration as assigned in the NY-Central Division.
- 48 Damage Surveyor Personnel were utilized in the NY-Central Division.
- 27 feeders were surveyed within 24 hours of the start of restoration.

Damage Assessment Staffing Summary

Damage Assessment Patrol staffing was supported by internal Company employees.

The next two tables illustrate Damage Assessment staffing by day for the event.

Location Region	06/22/2025 Sunday			06/23/2025 Monday		
	Company	Contractor	Total	Company	Contractor	Total
Mohawk Valley	38	10	**48**	38	10	**48**
Central	9	0	**9**	30	0	**30**
Northern	0	0	**0**	0	0	**0**
Total	**38**	**10**	**48**	**38**	**10**	**48**
Grand Totals	**38**	**10**	**48**	**38**	**10**	**48**

Location Region	06/24/2025 Tuesday		
	Company	Contractor	Total
Mohawk Valley	36	0	**36**
Central	0	0	**0**
Northern	0	0	**0**
Total	**36**	**0**	**36**
Grand Totals	**36**	**0**	**36**

Damage Assessment Patrols

Damage Assessment Type	6/22/2025 Sunday	6/23/2025 Monday	6/24/2025 Tuesday
	Feeder Total	Feeder Total	Feeder Total
Phase 1	17	0	0
Phase 2	10	28	0
Sweep	0	0	40

Final feeder sweeps were made in areas that saw the heaviest damage, areas of Oneida, Madison, Herkimer, Jefferson, and Oswego Counties, to obtain final damage assessments while nearing the completion of restoration and prior to the release of restoration resources. Feeder sweeps are performed to check that all services are restored and that all temporary repairs are noted and/or completed. This type of patrol allows for overhead line crews and other qualified resources to be more efficient at the end of an event by avoiding any unnecessary time re-patrolling circuits when they could be performing work that is better aligned with their qualifications.

4. <u>Wires Down</u>

Public safety during an event is the Company's primary concern. The elimination of hazards to the public takes precedence during emergencies and includes plans to promptly repair, secure, clear, or guard downed wires and make areas safe that are compromised with damaged electrical equipment. National Grid's response to wires down involved the dispatch of trained and qualified employees or contractors to investigate reports of downed wires, and public hazards to fix, make safe, and/or arrange for standby personnel if needed to protect the public.

During the Company's response to the June 22 storm, National Grid sent trained and qualified individuals to reported line trouble locations to verify if the reported trouble involved National Grid equipment and to expedite an appropriate response. If a Damage Assessment Patroller were to discover a down wire or a hazardous condition in the field in conjunction with performing their duties, they will remain on scene to protect the public until relieved by the proper personnel. The Damage Assessment Patroller will communicate with personnel at the local or regional Emergency Operations Center (EOC), who then coordinate the dispatch of resources to repair, make safe, clear, or guard the condition to allow the Damage Assessment Patroller to continue their assignment.

The type of resources that National Grid will dispatch to mitigate safety concerns includes:

- Trained and qualified Company overhead line resources, and trained and qualified contactor resources
    - Overhead Line resources (Company and contractor) are dispatched from the Company's EOC, sometimes referred to as the "Storm Room"
- Customer Meter Services (CMS) resources,
    - CMS resources are trained and qualified to work up to a certain voltage. CMS resources are dispatched from National Grid's centralized Upstate Dispatch and Scheduling (UDS) Center
- Wire Guard personnel, who are typically comprised of trained CMS representatives, meter readers, revenue collectors, gas mechanics, and contractors that have all been provided training for wire guard protection measures to maintain safety of the public
    - Wire Guards are dispatched from the local storm rooms. Collectively, these resources are commonly referred to as "Wire Responders" when dispatched to a down wire condition

There were 222 wires down incidents reported by an Emergency Management official in the Central Division during this event. The Company responded to 100 percent of these incidents within the 18-hour target timeframe from the start of restoration.

4. Wires Down

Division	Number of Wire Down Reports	Responded < 18 hrs.	Responded > 18 hrs.
NY-Central	222	222	0

There were no public incidents, shocks, fatalities, or customer satisfaction issues related to wire down activities during this event.

Wire down orders are reviewed by the overhead line supervisor at the area desk within the EOC. The overhead line supervisor coordinates a response as a function of priority and subsequently directs the type of resource to be dispatched to the order – either an overhead line crew or the order is sent to the UDS group for dispatch to a Customer Meter Service (CMS) representative.

The wire down order that is dispatched to an overhead line crew will be fixed or made safe. Communication is then made back to the EOC to provide information necessary to close the order. The overhead line crew will then continue to the next dispatched assignment.

Orders sent to UDS are dispatched to a responding CMS representative who is trained and qualified to perform work up to a specified voltage. If the wire down condition exceeds the training and qualification of the CMS representative, the representative will proceed to notify UDS of the need for an overhead line crew and at the same time request a wire guard. UDS will coordinate with the overhead line supervisor in the EOC for the dispatch of an overhead line crew to respond to the wire down call and coordinate with the Wire Down Group (that resides within the EOC) for the dispatch of a trained and qualified wire guard. The CMS representative will stand guard until relieved by a line crew or qualified wire guard. Once the wire guard arrives on scene, the CMS representative will then continue to their next assignment. The wire guard will remain on scene until the overhead line crew arrives to fix or make safe the wire down condition.

For non-911 wire down calls, the initial order is generated from the Contact Center through the customer service system. The order is directed to either the Division Control Center, or if a local storm room is open, to a local Overhead Line Supervisor who is charged with managing the orders for a specific area. The Overhead Line Supervisor will coordinate the response as a function of priority and severity of the wire down order and direct the appropriate resource to be dispatched to the location. The order will be dispatched to an overhead line crew or transferred to Upstate Dispatch for communication to a CMS representative. In instances where downed wires are being guarded by a Wire Guard crew and the overhead line crew arrives on the scene to assess and correct the issues, the Wire Guard unit is redirected to any additional open wires down requests to continue response to any open orders until such time they are completed and closed.

5. Crewing

Every event or emergency is unique, knowledge of the Company's infrastructure and the Company's experience with prior events is required to estimate the need for incremental resources. Factors such as weather forecasts or known hazard conditions such as snow, ice, rain, wind levels, existing foliage on trees, information in the OMS, customers affected or out of service, and transmission/sub-transmission outages are among the considerations that influence decisions around the necessary resource levels.

Based on the forecast, the appropriate number of line, service, and tree workers (Full-Time Equivalents or "FTEs") for the June 22, 2025 storm event was determined from a situational assessment of factors that included the weather forecast, known hazard conditions, and anticipated impact to the National Grid service territory. National Grid's preparation and response to this event included the review of internal staffing levels inclusive of Company contractors for all necessary disciplines across its service territory.

The actual impact from the weather event was inconsistent with the forecast, resulting in damage to the electric infrastructure that far exceeded what was originally anticipated. In response to the more severe than forecast weather conditions and impact from the storm, the Company determined that additional resources should be secured to support restoration activities in the areas that were severely affected.

The nature of the actual storm impacts allowed the Company to move resources among the Divisions. Whereas the original forecast anticipated a more general impact to the overall State, the actual impact was more dramatic and significant in the NY-Central Division, with minimal impacts to the NY-West and NY-East Divisions. The relatively lesser impacts in the NY-West and

NY-East Divisions enabled National Grid to immediately begin the movement of resources from those Divisions to the hardest hit areas in NY-Central.

Consistent with Section 6 of the NY-ERP, National Grid took immediate action to initiate the request for additional resources through direct contact with non-investor-owned utility (unaffiliated), external distribution line contractors in parallel with initiating a request for assistance from National Grid-Massachusetts.

- At 5:00am on 6/22/2025, National Grid initiated a request for incremental resources; 200 crews (495 FTE)
- On 6/22/2025 at 15:00, National Grid increased the request for additional external resources by 100 crews (250 FTE).
- On 6/22/2025 National Grid increased internal resources in the NY-Central Division by moving 20 internal Company crews (40 FTE) from NY-West to NY-Central and five internal Company crews (10 FTE) from NY-East to NY-Central.
- As reported on the Electric System Status Report ("ESSR") at 6/23/2025 at 7:00am, National Grid had secured a total commitment of 745 incremental, external FTE.
- 113 FTE from National Grid Massachusetts were moved to NY in the AM of 6/24/2025
- In total, National Grid secured a commitment of 2,436 incremental, external FTE resources for response and support of restoration efforts for this event as reported in the ESSR issued June 24, 2025, at 7:00am.

National Grid was prepared to participate in all North Atlantic Mutual Assistance Calls; however, no calls were held during this event.

North Atlantic Mutual Assistance Calls		
Call No.	**Date**	**Time**
1	None Held	

A summary of internal resource movements as follows:

Date	Resource Type	Resource Type	# of Crews	# of FTE	Secured From	Sent to (Division)	Expected Arrival Date	Time [AM/PM]
6/22/2025	Line	Internal NY Company	20	40	National Grid - NY West	NY-Central	6/22/2025	AM
6/22/2025	Line	Internal NY Company	5	10	National Grid - NY East	NY-Central	6/22/2025	AM
6/22/2025	Line	Direct Contact External Contractor	200	495	External Contractor Locations	NY-Central	6/22/2024	PM

6/22/2025	Tree	NY On-Property Contractor	24	55	Forestry	NY-Central	6/22/2025	PM
6/22/2025	Tree	NY On-Property Contractor	39	89	Forestry	NY-Central	6/22/2025	PM
6/22/2025	Line	Direct Contact External Contractor	100	250	External Contractor Locations	NY-Central	6/22/2025	PM
6/24/2025	Line	MA On-Property Contractor	40	113	National Grid - New England	NY-Central	6/24/2025	AM

A summary of National Grid's overall staffing for the event can be found in the tables below.

6/22/2025

Type of Resource	Internal/Contractor	# of Crews	# of FTE
Transmission Line	Internal	34	80
	Contractor (External)	11	28
Distribution Line (OH)	Internal	286	685
	Contractor (External)	500	745
Mutual Assistance	Internal	0	0
	Contractor (External)	0	0
Forestry	Internal	258	593
	Contractor (External)	0	0
Service Restoration	Internal	192	192
	Contractor (External)	0	0
Damage Assessment (DA)	Internal	107	107
	Contractor (External)	0	0
Wires Down/Wire Guard (WG) (Company Service FTE are used as Wire Guards to start event)	Internal	85	85
	Contractor (External)	0	0
Customer Call Center Staffing	Internal	N/A	29

6/23/2025

Type of Resource	Internal/Contractor	# of Crews	# of FTE
Transmission Line	Internal	34	80
	Contractor (External)	11	28
Distribution Line	Internal	274	685
	Contractor (External)	298	745
Mutual Assistance	Internal	0	0
	Contractor (External)	0	0
Forestry	Internal	258	593
	Contractor (External)	0	0

Service Restoration	Internal	82	82
	Contractor (External)	0	0
Damage Assessment	Internal	109	109
	Contractor (External)	10	10
Wires Down/Wire Guard (Company Service FTE are used as Wire Guards to start event)	Internal	82	82
	Contractor (External)	0	0
Support Personnel	Internal	N/A	2053
Customer Call Center Staffing	Internal	N/A	67

6/24/2025

Type of Resource	Internal/Contractor	# of Crews	# of FTE
Transmission Line	Internal	32	80
	Contractor (External)	11	28
Distribution Line	Internal	274	685
	Contractor (External)	291	728
Mutual Assistance	Internal	0	0
	Contractor (External)	40	113
Forestry	Internal	257	593
	Contractor (External)	0	0
Service Restoration	Internal	86	86
	Contractor (External)	0	0
Damage Assessment	Internal	109	109
	Contractor (External)	0	0
Wires Down/Wire Guard (Company Service FTE are used as Wire Guards to start event)	Internal	86	86
	Contractor (External)	0	0
Support Personnel	Internal	N/A	2053
Customer Call Center Staffing	Internal	N/A	88

6. Restoration

Restoration Process - General

National Grid's priority when responding to a storm event is the safety of the public and the Company's personnel. The Company first works to mitigate electrical hazards – such as downed (and potentially energized) wires and related electrical equipment that has been damaged – and make them safe. National Grid also works to prioritize relief to first responders (police and fire department personnel) who are guarding downed wires and electrical hazards.

The Company's process to restore power after a major event is a recognized industry standard and best practice for utilities to optimize restoration time. Repairs are generally made in the order of the path that electricity takes from the power plants to the customer. Company resources begin with transmission and primary circuits that can affect a large number of customers. Then, and often times in parallel, crews restore lateral distribution lines that can affect many customers;

secondary distribution lines that affect fewer customers; and, finally, service lines to individual customer homes and businesses.

Following an interruption of service or widespread prolonged outage, restoration priorities are established with the intention of safely restoring power to the most customers in the shortest time possible. Outages (or cases of trouble) can vary in terms of the number of customers associated with each outage or trouble case from thousands of customers to just one customer. By assigning resources to outages with the highest number of customers first, restoration can progress efficiently and typically in an order of priority that aligns with the priorities of the communities the Company serves.

At the same time, the Company works to restore services to Critical Facilities such as hospitals, police departments, firehouses, and other public health and safety facilities that are critical to the well-being of the community on a priority basis, as warranted. When possible, and safe to do so, the actions connected with these progressive steps of the restoration process are performed in parallel.

National Grid relied on the strength of relationships built over the years through regular coordination meetings, training, and exercises with external local and State partners using the framework and procedures outlined in the NY-ERP to coordinate any road clearing activities needed by the county to assist with gaining access to affected areas impacted by the severe weather events in the respective Divisions.

While the restoration process cannot guarantee or provide priority restoration, National Grid conducts specific outreach programs to Critical Facility Customers, LSE customers, and other customers with special needs to help them prepare for power outages and remain informed of the Company's response throughout the event. These programs provide designated customers with an expanded level of communication that includes pre-event notifications (for forecasted events) and daily outreach during the Company's response and restoration to help customers with continuity planning that they are responsible for. That said, National Grid works with county and State Emergency Management Officials if there is a need to shift the Company's restoration priorities to important, emergent matters in an impacted community. It also is not uncommon for some customers to have their service restored while a storm is just beginning and/or growing in intensity, or even when a storm is at its worst. Such service restorations may be the result of the Company's efforts to mitigate electrical hazards or may be the result of switching in the electrical system, which may enable the Company to serve customers from a variety of sources. When the Company is working to mitigate electrical hazards, even during dangerous field conditions, the outcome from cutting and clearing debris from the system, or automatically or manually switching circuits, can result in interrupted customers having their service restored. The restoration phase of a storm begins when resources are able to fully and safely carry out all work practices connected with the assessment and repair of damage to the electric system. This point in time is typically aligned with the expiration of weather warnings or advisories coupled with the first light of day following a severe weather event. Once it is safe to deploy crews into the field, the decision of where to dispatch resources first follows the restoration prioritization framework described above to make the area safe and restore as many customers as possible as quickly as possible.

Definitions

Several of the metrics used to assess utility performance in preparing for and responding to a storm are based on different points in the lifecycle of the event. These different points are based on a variety of factors, and the Company restates them here for clarity and convenience.

Start of Event - The point in time when more than 5,000 customers are interrupted within a division for more than 30 minutes, or more than 20,000 customers are interrupted companywide for more than 30 minutes. If the event affects less than the customer counts listed, the start time shall be the earlier of the peak level of interruptions or start of utility restoration.

Peak Outage - Peak outage is the highest number of customers whose service was interrupted at the same time.

Widespread Prolonged Outage - For an electric outage, an event in which service is interrupted to at least 20,000 customers at the same time and having one or more customers who remain without power for 72 hours or more due to utility-owned equipment unable to provide power.

Start of Restoration - The start of utility restoration is the point in time when field personnel are able to be dispatched without unacceptable safety risks from continued severe weather conditions (where adverse weather conditions are applicable) and when the potential additional damage to the electric system from the storm would be low in proportion to the expected level of damage already sustained. The start of the restoration period may be different for distinct areas where the effect of a storm limited access to facilities (e.g., severe flooding).

Total Customers Affected - Customers that have been interrupted and restored one or more times during the period are counted for each time they have been interrupted and restored. This amount is an estimate based on data from the outage management system and is subject to change. This number has the potential to exceed the total number of customers in the district, region, or division impacted.

Customer Restoration - Customer restoration will be considered complete when for each customer, service has been restored or service is available but would be unsafe to restore due to damage with customer-owned equipment or a compromised structure (e.g., condemned).

The timing or sequence of events associated with a typical storm is such that the severe weather will impact an area over several hours and within 8 – 12 hours of being impacted by the storm and incurring physical damage to the electric infrastructure serving customers, the utility can systematically move from “Start of Event” to “Start of Restoration” in a reasonable amount of time.

The pattern of damage in the Central Division was concentrated and significant, with the most severely impacted areas as follows:

NY-Central (Counties)	
Oneida	Oswego
Madison	Lewis
Herkimer	Jefferson

Damage consisted of a significant number of down trees, broken tree limbs, broken poles, damaged transformers, and other hazards.

The table below provides a summary of the broken poles and transformers replaced for the June 22, 2025, severe weather event:


Division	Broken Poles	Transformers Replaced
NY-Central	310	107
TOTAL	**310**	**107**

The key "points in time" associated with the June 22, 2025, severe weather events are illustrated in the tables below for the State and affected Division.

	NY-Central
Event Timing	**Date / Time**
Start of Event (SOE)	6/22/2025 03:10
Peak	6/22/2025 04:00
Start of Restoration (SOR)	6/22/2025 08:00
Customer Restoration	6/25/2025 14:52
95% Restored - of Peak	6/25/2025 12:00
95% Restored - of Total Affected	6/23/2025 21:00

	NY-Central
Hours to Restore From:	**Hours**
95% Restored from SOE[1]	44:20:00
95% Restored from SOR[1]	39:30:00
95% Restored from Peak[2]	66:30:00
Customer Restoration SOE	83:42:00
Customer Restoration SOR	78:52:00
Customer Restoration from Peak	82:52:00
Peak Customers	**64,657**
Total Customers Affected	**146,359**
Note	
1-Based on Total Cust. Affected	
2-Based on Peak Cust. Affected	

The following graph illustrates the restoration curves for the affected areas along with the key points in time plotted on the respective display:



No temporary facilities (i.e., portable sub-stations or generators) were required or used during restoration.

The type of damage in this storm did not require the activation of the Company's expedited electric service inspection procedures because customer equipment requiring repairs before their service could be reconnected was minimal. National Grid was able to work closely with those customers that did sustain damage to their equipment on a case-by-case basis to expedite the reconnection of their service.

The Company maximized the use of daylight when in the restoration phase, noting the hazards and safety concerns associated with working at night. Night operations were generally covered by one person line crews to make safe or repair when possible down wires and safety concerns. Two-person line and tree crews worked into the night on outages where completion was either imminent or necessary due to safety concerns or deemed critical to the community.

Summary of Standard Shift Schedule for Responding Crews*	
Transmission and Distribution Line Mechanics	06:00 to 23:00 daily
1st shift OPCs	06:00 to 23:00 daily
2nd and 3rd shift OPCs	13:00 to 06:00 daily
Forestry	06:00 to 23:00 daily
Wire Down Organization	06:00 to 23:00 daily

*Actual schedules for individual crews may vary depending on conditions, local plans, the jobs they are working on, and or access and mobility issues associated with the particular

circumstances.

The Company's safety specialists and environmental personnel maintained a presence in the field by conducting numerous field safety observations of Company, mutual assistance, and external contractor crews.

Consistent safety messaging, work practice expectations, and issue follow-up was coordinated through the Branch Operations organization. Safety specialists provided material for daily safety briefings that highlighted inherent hazards that individuals might encounter during the restoration process and provided assistance and coordination for safety expectation briefings with foreign crews as they arrived.

Public safety information was provided by the Safety and Health organization to the Public Information Coordinator for use in the materials published throughout the various communication channels.

Throughout the restoration process, National Grid maintained a strong community presence and outreach with key stakeholders and customers. This included:

- Contacting LSE customers to check on their status and provide updates that include available ETRs.
    - Absent being able to make telephone contact; physically visiting the premise once daily until the customer has been restored.
- Contacting Critical Facility customers daily to provide updates that include available ETRs.
- Automated customer calls to provide updates on the status of the restoration.
- Frequent press releases and participation in radio and TV interviews as requested.
- Embedding personnel at county EOCs as needed.
- Updating the Company's external website with important safety and storm updates.
- Facilitating a total of six Community Leader Conference Calls with key members of local government, municipal, and other public officials.
- Updating the Company's internal website to keep employees informed.
- Providing updates to customers through social media channels.
- Utilizing the Company's interactive text service and various social media tools.
- Distributing dry ice and bottled water at various distribution locations in the impacted areas.

7. ETRs

National Grid is committed to meeting customer expectations for providing prompt and accurate ETRs as soon as possible using the best information available at the time while responding to an emergency or widespread prolonged outage. The Company follows the Estimated Time of Restoration Protocol set forth in NY-ERP, Section 15.2.

National Grid utilizes information from the OMS, customer calls, information associated with 911 calls, damage assessment surveys, and feedback from resources working in the field to understand the extent of damage incurred to develop ETRs that are as accurate as possible. ETRs are then published through a variety of communication channels and are used by customers and stakeholders for planning purposes.

The ETR Protocol is activated when more than 5,000 customers are out of service in a division or more than 20,000 customers are out of service companywide for more than 30 minutes. National Grid's NY-Central Division met the criteria to initiate the ETR Protocol for which the Company activated the Electric System Status Report ("ESSR"). The Company submitted the first report to the Commission on June 22, 2025, at 1100 hours. ESSR reports are also referred to as four-hour reports, and are issued at 7:00am, 11:00am, 3:00pm, and 7:00pm throughout an event, until directed to end reporting.

The ETR Protocol establishes a specific set of activities that must be performed within a certain number of hours from the "Start of Restoration." Start of Restoration is explained in Section 6, above, and is the point in time when field personnel are able to be dispatched without unacceptable safety risks from continued severe weather conditions and when the potential additional damage to the electric system from the storm would be low compared to the expected level of damage already sustained. The Start of Restoration is a reference point to assess compliance of the utility against the time bound requirements associated with the ETR Protocol used for the event. The ETR Protocol is structured to enable the utility to conduct the activities needed to provide customers with the most accurate information available at that particular time. The "Start of Restoration" is the point of reference for all time bound requirements associated with the ETR Protocol. Requiring utilities to develop and communicate ETRs pursuant to the ETR Protocol provides for a consistent, repeatable, and sustainable process that is widely understood and accepted by the utility, the regulator, State and County Emergency Management officials, and key stakeholders, and enables utilities going into an emergency to know what to expect in terms of timing around the publishing and communication of ETRs. The ETR Protocol process enables utilities to assemble the best information available at the time to provide the most accurate estimate as to when service will be restored. Within the first six hours from the Start of Restoration, the Company determined that the restoration period for the NY-Central Division was anticipated to exceed 48 hours in duration for 90% of the affected customers. Based on this assessment, the Company followed the communication requirements described in NY-ERP Section 15.2 for an event expected to last this duration for the respective Division.

Types of ETRs

ETRs are based on National Grid's latest analysis of the data inputs around damage sustained and available resources to reflect a general assessment of when the last customer in the specified area (Global, Regional, Local) would be expected to be returned to service. There are several types of ETRs that a customer will see during the lifecycle of the storm response:

Assessing – an ETR of Assessing is typically used at the onset of a severe weather event or impact to an area that will require extensive restoration activities during the timeframe leading up to publishing the initial ETR (e.g., the Global or Regional ETR). Thus, when the ETR is noted as "Assessing," an ETR is not available at that time.

Global - Global ETRs may be used initially for outage events where the anticipated effects from the event are likely to result in a restoration period greater than 48 hours in duration for 90% of the affected customers. Global ETRs are applied at the Division level. Once a Regional ETR is published, the Global ETR shall no longer be referenced. National Grid published a Global ETR in this event for NY-East while accelerating the publishing of the Regional ETRs in NY-Central. National Grid was able to do this based on the nature of the damage in NY-Central being highly

localized between two counties while the damage in NY-East was more widespread, warranting the additional time provided in the ETR Protocol to issue the Global ETR in an effort to provide the most accurate information available at the time.

Regional – Regional ETRs are applicable to the National Grid Regional level which can be analogous to the counties served within that Region. National Grid published Regional ETRs for the Central, Northern, Mohawk Valley, Capital, Capital West, and Northeast Regions ahead of the time prescribed in the NY-ERP ETR Protocol, thereby offering a more granular view of restoration times where possible.

Local – Local ETRs are applicable to the National Grid District level which can be analogous to the towns and cities within that District. National Grid did not publish Local ETRs as we bypassed the provision of local ETRs and provided Ticket Level ETRs after Regional ETRs, providing more accurate information to the customer ahead of the prescribed NY-ERP ETR Protocol timeline.

Ticket – Ticket level ETRs are associated with the individual customer's restoration time.

8. Communications

Activities taken to communicate with public, municipal and government offices

When it became clear that the impact from the June 22 storm was more significant than originally forecast, the Company's Branch Liaison, Public Information, and Contact Center teams initiated a broad set of outreach activities to establish contact with the State and local departments of emergency services, Critical Facility customers, LSE customers, and key local and elected officials to communicate the Company's plans for the event.

Information exchanged on a regular basis with local officials included a summary of customers interrupted, customers restored, total customers affected, crewing information on site and in route, planned crew relocation and mutual assistance activity, discussion of major damage, estimated restoration times, summaries of work plans for restoring customers, listing of Critical Facility and LSE customers affected, and a summary of dry ice/bottled water distribution activities.

Community Leader Conference Calls

Consistent with Section 18.5 of the NY-ERP, the Company held daily Community Leader Conference calls until more than 90 percent of the total affected customers were restored. In addition to the Community Leader Conference calls, individual county level calls were conducted at the request of Department of Public Service Staff.

Communication and coordination efforts were maintained throughout the event with county and municipal officials that included Community Liaisons making individual calls to provide responses to requests by phone, text message, email, and general informational e-mail communications. Each county was assigned a dedicated Community Liaison.

The initial Community Leader Conference Calls are listed in the table below by Division and date performed.

Community Leader Conference Calls	
Division	**Date**
NY-Central	06/22/2025 16:00 (4:00PM)
NY-Central	06/23/2025 16:00 (4:00PM)
NY-Central	06/24/2025 16:00 (4:00PM)

The Company took questions at the end of each call and responded accordingly (when applicable).

Interaction with Emergency Management Offices

As part of the Company's outreach and communication efforts, every County Emergency Manger in the affected areas was proactively contacted.

Community liaisons worked with local County Emergency Management, key stakeholders, and local officials to address road closures, critical infrastructure outages, and any issues of concern to counties. Each county had a Community Liaison assigned to them that had local knowledge of the area that they supported.

Community Liaisons conducted proactive outreach to impacted counties by sharing updates that included press releases, number of outages by town in their counties, and estimated times of restoration.

Traditional and Social Media Activity

The Company used several media platforms to inform customers and community leadership how the Company was responding to this event. Consistent with Section 17 of the NY-ERP, the National Grid Public Information team issued key messages in press releases and approved internal communications to provide consistent updates on restoration progress, photos of storm damage, localized restoration efforts, and FAQs about how power is restored.

Supporting information for this section is included in Section 18 and Appendix 18 of the Company's July 25, 2025, Scorecard report filed in Matter No. 25-01548.

Overall, these actions facilitated effective communication throughout the event. National Grid maintained regular contact with local municipal officials, including mayors and town supervisors, during the restoration process.

Use of social media and websites and all press releases, articles, and interviews

The State Public Information Officer coordinated with the State Incident Commander to develop messages disseminated to the media, government, community leaders, regulators and employees through various communication channels including, but not limited to, the Customer Contact Center, press conferences, web and social media, interviews, dedicated press phone lines, and the State Liaison Officer. Once the increased severity of the forecast was known, the Company quickly advanced information through a host of communication channels to inform customers and key stakeholders of the potential for severe weather and weather-related safety concerns and power outages.

Contact Center performance/statistics and Contact Center Staffing

The Contact Center has a large number of telephone lines available to respond to customer calls during non-emergency times. These telephone lines are segmented geographically based on population. The Contact Center also has the ability to reallocate telephone lines to allow for greater accessibility to customers impacted in storm-damaged areas and has the ability to transfer geographical areas of customers to third-party vendors to allow for greater customer access during major outages.

In addition to all the communication, e-mail, texting, website, and social media opportunities to communicate with National Grid during blue-sky days or major events, customers may call directly into the Contact Center to interact with the Company during emergencies. The National Grid Contact Center strives to meet or exceed the established performance measures described in the Utility Emergency Performance Metrics (NY-Scorecard) as part of the Company's storm response.

The Contact Center staffing on June 22, 2025, was appropriate based on the initial forecast. Contact Center leadership was included in the planning and coordination efforts associated with the anticipated weather system and maintained heightened awareness to evolving conditions.

Upon the impact of the severe weather event, National Grid received the following volume of storm-related customer calls throughout the duration of the event response:

Date	Total Calls	Calls answered within 90 sec.
6/22/2025	3,109	2,442
6/23/2025	1,626	1,364
6/24/2025	765	712
6/25/2025	517	467

There are many variables that drive staffing level decisions during an emergency response such as the call answer rate, number of customers affected, and calls in queue. To respond to these variables, the Customer Contact Center has the following resources available to assist in matching staffing to call volume:

- Primary Contact Center Staff
- Home Agents
- Accounts Processing
- NCI – a third-party vendor
- The ability to transfer calls to the National Grid Contact Center in Massachusetts
- An IVR application that automatically initiates support as a function of wait time allowing time to activate home agents and internal back-up strategies to meet demand
- Location specific messaging to help manage queue

The Contact Center maintained appropriate staffing throughout the course of the event.

Dry Ice distribution, bottled water, and other humanitarian efforts

Consistent with Section 18.10 of the NY-ERP, because the weather forecast did not indicate that the anticipated effects from the event were likely to result in a restoration period greater than 48 hours in duration for 90% of the affected customers, the Company did not make logistics plans prior to the event to distribute dry ice. However, when it became clear that the June 22, 2025, weather event was more significant than originally forecast, the Company's Branch Liaison Coordinator initiated a comprehensive set of outreach activities to establish contact with County Emergency Management Officials to coordinate locations for the opening of multiple dry ice and bottled water distribution sites.

National Grid's dry ice distribution operations were operational and open to the public in the affected communities within the first 12 hours from the start of restoration. Three distribution centers were established in the NY-Central Division where dry ice and bottled water was distributed to customers over the course of the restoration. The dry ice and bottled water distribution site locations and hours of operations were made public by incorporating this information into the Company's web site, mobile application, press releases and social media outlets.

In addition to National Grid's communication and coordination efforts, all regulatory reporting was provided to Department of Public Service Staff in accordance with the requirements of the Emergency Response Plan.

9. Critical Facilities Customers / Life Support Equipment Customers

Critical Facility Customers

Critical Facility Customers are defined as those facilities from which essential services, functions for the continuation of public health and safety, and disaster recovery are performed or provided such as hospitals, water plants, and fire stations.

Consistent with Section 17.3 of the NY-ERP, because the weather forecast did not indicate that the anticipated effects from the event were likely to result in a restoration period greater than 48 hours in duration for 90% of the affected customers, the Company did not make pre-event outbound calls to any Critical Facility Customers.

Upon impact from the weather event exceeding forecast expectations, the Company took immediate action to initiate outreach to Critical Facility Customers, community leaders, and key stakeholders to inform them of how the Company was responding to this event.

Date	Time of Call	Number of Critical Facility Customers Contacted
6/22/2025	Ongoing throughout the day	55
6/23/2025	Ongoing throughout the day	42
6/24/2025	Ongoing throughout the day	11

Outreach to the affected Critical Facility Customers continued until the customers were fully restored.

Life Support Equipment (LSE) Customers

The Commission's regulations (16 NYCRR § 105.4(b)(9)) define LSE customers as those customers who require electrically operated machinery to sustain basic life functions. This includes designated electrically operated medical equipment prescribed by a qualified physician to be used on a continuous basis or as circumstances require as specified by the physician to avoid the loss of life or serious medical complications requiring immediate hospitalization. The following is the list of LSE (listed in Senate Bill S931A) to include but not be limited to:

a). Apnea monitors for infants
b). Cuirass respirators
c). Hemodialysis machines
d). IV feeding machines
e). IV medical / IV Infusion machines
f). Oxygen concentrators
g). Positive pressure respirators
h). Respirator / ventilators
i). Rocking bed respirators
j). Suction machines
k). Tank type respirators

In addition to the equipment listed, any medical equipment or equipment necessary for an individual whose diagnosis is likely to be significantly triggered or significantly exacerbated by a continued loss of power that will adversely impact that individual's health will also be included and subject the certification and annual recertification.

Recognizing the importance of electricity to their well-being, National Grid makes every effort to notify LSE customers of potential severe weather events as soon as possible. When the Company has advance notification of a severe weather forecast that could interrupt electric service to the LSE customers' dwelling, notice from National Grid allows LSE customers to prepare or make the necessary arrangements to secure a safe environment during such events.

National Grid has a team dedicated to maintaining the list of LSE customers. When an LSE customer cannot be reached using the contact information they provided upon enrollment or recertification for the program, the team utilizes internal and external tools and resources to obtain updated customer information, including contact information and eligibility status. The team also follows established regulatory protocols for requesting approval to remove customers from the program if it is determined they are no longer eligible due to death, removal of equipment, or an incomplete application.

Because the weather forecast did not indicate that the anticipated effects from the event were likely to result in a restoration period exceeding 48 hours, the Company did not make pre-event outbound calls to its LSE customers in the NY-Central or NY-East Divisions. As detailed below, outbound calls to LSE-identified customers began immediately during the early stages of the weather event once the impact of the event was realized.

On June 22 starting at 3:10 am, the Company commenced making electronic outbound calls to 166 LSE customers in National Grid's NY-Central Division. After the 12-hour requirement customers were accounted for and contacted, 15 additional LSE customers in NY-Central were added to the daily required calls for additional customer outages.

The message content was as follows:

"This is National Grid. Our records show that an individual who requires medical care or life sustaining equipment is at this address. A storm has impacted many of our customers with service interruptions. I am contacting you as part of our program to confirm your well-being. Please press 8 to connect with a representative or dial 1-800-460-0316 once again, that number is 1-800-460-0316 to connect with an agent and notify them that you are currently with or without power or help us confirm you are OK and avoid *the need to send a field visit to your home. Once again, please press 8 to speak to a live agent. If you are currently with or without power or have evacuated and to help us ensure we are aware of the most current state of your service with us. You may also call us back on this number or you can press 8 on the phone after the tone. Thank you for being a National Grid customer. "*

National Grid remained compliant with NY-ERP Section 17.4 in its implementation and coordination of activities with its LSE customers. The Company identified all LSE customers affected by the electrical emergency in a timely manner and established a regular channel of communication to monitor the well-being of these customers until their electrical service was restored. National Grid attempted to contact LSE customers known to be served by circuits affected by the damage caused by the June 22 storm event. Contacts by telephone were made as soon as possible after the circuits serving LSE program enrolled customers had been identified.

The Company made attempts to contact affected LSE customers daily, and in many instances, several times per day, during the period when the Company had reason to believe that the LSE customer may have been in their dwelling without electrical service. As required, the Company arranged for National Grid resources to physically visit the premises once daily of those LSE customers that could not be contacted through numerous telephone attempts. All LSE customers identified to be without power during the event were either contacted by telephone or personally visited by a Company employee, first responder, or municipal official as coordinated by the Company during the course of the restoration process for each 24-hour period during the response. The status of the Company's LSE activities was regularly reported as part of the EORS report cycle provided to Department of Public Service Staff.

10. Storm Critique and Action Items

An After-Action Review meeting was conducted within two weeks following the restoration of service to our customers in the NY-Central Division.

A review of lessons learned and improvement plan items follows:

1. **Improvement Opportunity – Establish quarterly internal meetings between Emergency Planning and the Company's Contractor Management Team**
   a. Emergency Planning works closely with the Contract Management Team throughout the course of the year and in particular during emergencies and storm response.
   b. The purpose of establishing a quarterly meeting would be to review activities that involve Company contractors and 3rd party contractors secured during events.
   c. Topics to be reviewed on a regular basis would include:
      i. The Company listing of all 3rd party contractors for overhead line, damage assessment, and wire guarding
      ii. 3rd party contractor reporting
      iii. Border crossing procedures
      iv. Other issues as required

   Improvement Plan – Schedule and conduct first of the quarterly Emergency Planning / Contractor Management Team meetings by the end of September 2025
   1. Initiate quarterly meeting, starting September 2025 (the end of 2nd quarter of the fiscal year)

2. **Improvement Opportunity – Explore the implementation of a Hotel Ambassador Storm Role**
   a. During larger responses where a significant number of external resources are secured, additional coordination and support is often required at the hotel where such resources are being lodged.
   b. The creation of a storm role titled "Hotel Ambassador" will serve at the identified hotels where the larger contingents of external contractors will be lodged to facilitate check-in, and manage any on-site issues that may come up at the hotel throughout the event.
   c. Hotel Ambassadors will contribute to the efficiency of National Grid's logistics activities, resulting in improved check-in and on-site issue resolution, which will allow the office-based logistics teams to focus on the broader strategy-based activities associated with lodging and meals for restoration resources.

   Improvement Plan – Complete review, assignment, and training by December 15, 2025
   1. Schedule exploratory meetings to be concluded before the end of September to develop the scope, roles, and responsibilities of the Hotel Ambassador.
   2. Identify individuals in each Division to be assigned the role of Hotel Ambassador.
   3. Assign the identified employees to the role and provide any training required for the Hotel Ambassador.

11. Supporting Information

Supporting information for this report is included in the following appendices to the Company's July 25, 2025, "Utility Emergency Performance Metrics New York Scorecard" for the June 22, 2025 Severe Weather Event filed in Matter No. 25-01548.

- Appendix W. Weather
- Appendix 1.5 Critical Facilities Notified
- Appendix 1.6 Training
- Appendix 1.8 Materials and Stockpiles
- Appendix 2 Down Wires
- Appendix 3 Damage Assessments
- Appendix 13 Call Answer Rates
- Appendix 14 Municipal Calls
- Appendix 16 LSE Customers
- Appendix 17 PSC Reporting
- Appendix 18 Customer Communications
- Appendix 19 Outgoing Messages